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Abstract
The (Strong) Free Will Theorem (fwt) of Conway & Kochen (2009) on the one hand
follows from uncontroversial parts of modern physics and elementary mathematical
and logical reasoning, but on the other hand seems predicated on an undefined notion
of free will (allowing physicists to “freely choose” the settings of their experiments).
This makes the theorem philosophically vulnerable, especially if it is construed as a
proof of indeterminism or even of libertarian free will (as Conway & Kochen suggest).
However, Cator and the author (Foundations of Physics 44, 781–791, 2014) pre-
viously gave a reformulation of the fwt that does not presuppose indeterminism,
but rather assumes a mathematically specific form of such “free choices” even in a
deterministic world (based on a non-probabilistic independence assumption). In the
present paper, which is a philosophical sequel to the one just mentioned, I argue that
the concept of free will used in the latter version of the fwt is essentially the one
proposed by Lewis (1981), also known as ‘local miracle compatibilism’ (of which I give
a mathematical interpretation that might be of some independent interest also beyond
its application to the fwt). As such, the (reformulated) fwt in my view challenges
compatibilist free will a` la Lewis (albeit in a contrived way via bipartite epr-type
experiments), falling short of supporting libertarian free will.
Keywords: Free Will Theorem, Local Miracle Compatibilism
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1
1 The Free Will Theorem
The Free Will Theorem (fwt) of Conway & Kochen (2006, 2009) shows that some small
and uncontroversial corner of quantum mechanics (i.e., the response of massive parti-
cles with spin one to measurements of their spin) combined with a rather weak locality
condition suggested by Einstein’s theory of special relativity (which effectively forbids su-
perluminal signaling), is incompatible with the conjunction of determinism and the ability
of experimentalists to “freely choose” the directions along which they measure spin. The
fwt was published in two versions, of which the second, called the Strong Free Will Theo-
rem by Conway and Kochen, has superseded the first (which may therefore be discarded).
Conway and Kochen (2009, p. 226) paraphrase their theorem in the following way:
‘if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have
their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the ex-
perimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus
in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the
universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous
history of the universe. (. . . ) our theorem asserts that if experimenters have a
certain freedom, then particles have exactly the same kind of freedom. Indeed,
it is natural to suppose that this latter freedom is the ultimate explanation of
our own. (. . . ) Granted our three axioms [i.e., the physical ones and freedom
of choice], the Free Will Theorem shows that nature itself is nondeterministic.’
It is clear from Conway’s recent biography (Roberts, 2015) that the authors saw their
fwt as a major contribution to science (perhaps even to philosophy), and indeed it has
generated considerable publicity. Part of this interest has been rather critical (cf. Bassi &
Ghirardi, 2007; ‘t Hooft, 2007; Goldstein et al, 2010; Wu¨thrich, 2011; Hemmick & Shakur,
2012; Cator &Landsman, 2014; Hermens, 2014, 2016), mainly on the following grounds:
1. Lack of novelty compared with the famous paper by Bell (1964), whose assump-
tions and conclusions are at least quite similar to those of the fwt, although the
underlying proofs are mathematically distinct from those in the fwt.
2. Lack of novelty even within its own terms: almost identical results, even based on
very similar mathematical reasoning, had previously been published by Heywood &
Redhead (1983), Stairs (1983), Brown & Svetlichny (1990), and Clifton (1993).
3. Circularity, in that indeterminism is presupposed (namely in the assumption that
‘experimenters have a certain freedom’) instead of derived.
I only discuss these criticisms here in so far as they justify my own contribution; my take
is that all of the above criticism is deserved, but that nonetheless the fwt is an interesting
result, which triggers further discussion (of which the present paper is an instance).
1. The difference between earlier literature (of which, incidentally, Conway & Kochen
only cite Heywood & Redhead) and the fwt is almost exclusively one of emphasis,
namely on free will. Given this emphasis, it is striking that one looks in vain for
serious philosophical analysis in Conway & Kochen (2006, 2009). All one finds is:
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‘The tension between human free will and physical determinism has a long
history. Long ago, Lucretius made his otherwise deterministic particles
swerve unpredictably to allow for free will. It was largely the great success
of deterministic classical physics that led to the adoption of determinism
by so many philosophers and scientists, particularly those in fields remote
from current physics. (This remark also applies to “compatibilism”, a
now unnecessary attempt to allow for human free will in a deterministic
world.)’ (Conway & Kochen, 2009, p. 230).
Also elsewhere, one finds little respect for the philosophical debate on free will, e.g.,
‘Compatibilism in my view is silly. Sorry, I shouldn’t just say straight off
that it is silly. Compatibilism is an old viewpoint from previous centuries
when philosophers were talking about free will. The were accustomed to
physical theory being deterministic. And then there’s the question: How
can we have free will in this deterministic universe? Well, they sat and
thought for ages and ages and ages and read books on philosophy and God
knows what and they came up with compatibilism, which was a tremen-
dous wrenching effect to reconcile 2 things which seemed incompatible.
And they said they were compatible after all. But nobody would ever
have come up with compatibilism if they thought, as turns out to be the
case, that science wasn’t deterministic. The whole business of compati-
bilism was to reconcile what science told you at the time, centuries ago
down to 1 century ago: Science appeared to be totally deterministic, and
how can we reconcile that with free will, which is not deterministic? So
compatibilism, I see it as out of date, really. It’s doing something that
doesn’t need to be done. However, compatibilism hasn’t gone out of date,
certainly, as far as the philosophers are concerned. Lots of them are still
very keen on it. How can I say it? If you do anything that seems im-
possible, you’re quite proud when you appear to have succeeded. And so
really the philosophers don’t want to give up this notion of compatibilism
because it seems to damned clever. But my view is it’s really nonsense.
And it’s not necessary. So whether it actually is nonsense or not doesn’t
matter.’ (Conway, quoted in Roberts, 2015, pp. 361–362).
Thus the main goal of the present paper is to relate the fwt (whatever its novelty
compared to its predecessors) to the philosophy of free will. However, the (negative)
relationship we are going to establish will be with compatibilist free will a` la Lewis,
as opposed to the (positive) relationship with libertarian free will envisaged (but not
analyzed in any detail) by Conway & Kochen; the floor remains open for the latter.
2. Regarding the earlier work of Bell, Conway & Kochen (2006) acknowledged that:
‘Our result is by no means the first in this direction. It makes use of the
notorious quantum mechanical entanglement brought to light by Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen, which has also been used in various forms by J.S.
Bell, Kochen and Specker, and others to produce no-go theorems that
dispose of the most plausible hidden variable theories. Our theorem seems
to be the strongest and most precise result of this type.’
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The precise relationship between the fwt and Bell’s Theorem was analyzed in detail
in Cator & Landsman (2014), with the following conclusion:
(a) Both Bell (1964) and the original version of the fwt in Conway & Kochen
(2009) use an informal way of talking about free settings, granting which both
establish a contradiction between determinism, locality (in the sense of Bell,
which in the presence of determinism reduces to what is called parameter in-
dependence), and quantum mechanics. The difference lies in three facts:
i. Bell relies on probability theory (whereas the fwt does not).
ii. The (optical) corner of quantum mechanics used in Bell’s Theorem may be
replaced by the corresponding experimental results, whereas the fwt uses
uncontroversial yet untested predictions about massive spin-1 particles.
iii. The fwt must assume perfect (epr) correlations, which are difficult to re-
alize and hence are avoided by later versions of Bell’s Theorem (i.e. through
the well-known chsh inequalities rather than the original Bell inequalities).
(b) The same three differences persist also in the new versions of both Bell’s The-
orem and the fwt proposed by Cator & Landsman (2014), in which the ex-
perimentalists’ “freedom” of choosing settings is defined rigorously (in a prob-
abilistic and a deterministic framework, respectively).
3. Conway & Kochen (2006) themselves already anticipated the criticism of circularity
on the very first page of their first paper:
“‘I saw you put the fish in!” said a simpleton to an angler who had used
a minnow to catch a bass. Our reply to an analogous objection would be
that we use only a minuscule amount of human free will to deduce free
will not only of the particles inside ourselves, but all over the universe.’
This did not stop Wu¨thrich (2011) from concluding that:
‘Their case against determinism thus has all the virtues of theft over honest
toil. It is truly indeterminism in, indeterminism out.’
Both are right: the fwt is far from circular, but its conclusion would be much
more transparent if Wu¨thrich’s charge could be dispelled. This is exactly what has
been achieved in Cator & Landsman (2014), at least mathematically: we show that
rather than “indeterminism in, indeterminism out”, the thrust of the fwt is really:
“determinism in, constraints on determinism out’ ’.
What is missing, then, from both the original papers by Conway & Kochen (2006, 2009)
and the reformulation of the fwt by Cator and the author, is a serious analysis of the
(philosophical) kind of free will assumed in the theorem, and thence of the implications of
the theorem for that specific kind. The present paper attempts to fill this gap. In fact, it
bridges a canyon, in relating the philosophical prose typical of at least the Lewisian corner
of the free will literature (which I briefly review in §2) to elementary mathematics of the
kind relevant to the fwt. This is done in §3, upon which the actual application to the
fwt in §4 is straightforward. Finally, §5 contains my conclusions.1
1Since I base my analysis on our own revised fwt, any conclusions from this analysis about the original
version can only be indirect, but in my opinion the potential link between indeterminism in the quantum
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2 Compatibilist free will a` la David Lewis
The first question is which philosophical notion of free will is among the assumptions of our
revised fwt. Determinism being among the other assumptions, the answer must surely
lie in the compatibilist direction, and I argue that more specifically one is close to the
well-known ‘local miracle’ variant thereof due to Lewis (1981).2 Following Moore (1912,
Ch. 6) and others in his wake, Lewis attempts to make sense of the intuition that even in
a deterministic world one in principle has the ability to act differently from the way one
actually does, despite the fact that the latter was predetermined. A standard example is
that Alice’s hand still rests on the table, although she was able to raise it. According to
Lewis (1981), the way out is to realize that there is a fundamental difference between:
• I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law would be broken.
• I am able to break a law.
Namely, the latter is impossible (which seems uncontroversial) but the former is not (which
needs explanation). The first possibility rests on the theory of counterfactuals of Lewis
himself (1973, 1979), according to which the antecedent ‘if I did it’ leads me to consider the
possible world in which doing ‘something’ is actually possible, whilst as many other things
as possible are kept the same as in the actual world (the precise underlying measure of
similarity is not important here). However—and this a potential source of confusion—the
conclusion that ‘a law would be broken’ refers to the actual world: the world in which
‘I did it’ is a different one. Thus although Lewis’s position is often called local miracle
compatbilism, a miracle takes place neither in the actual world where Alice’s hand is at
rest, nor in the possible world where she raises it. In other words, a law is broken neither
in the former nor in the latter world. As Beebee (2013, p. 62) explains:
‘This is what Lewis means by a ‘miracle’: an event M is a miracle if and only
if M occurs at possible world w, and M is contrary to some actual law (or
combination of laws) L. The point here is that while M is a miracle in Lewis’s
sense, it is not contrary to any of w’s laws of nature. At w, L simply isn’t a
law in the first place. So, as things actually happened—in the actual world—L
is a law, and M does not occur, so there is no miracle in the usual sense of
‘miracle’. M is only a ‘miracle’ in Lewis’s special sense of ‘miracle’: something
(M) happens in w that is contrary to the laws of nature in the actual world.’
Throughout his analysis, Lewis himself takes a “miracle” to be a modification of the laws of
nature between different worlds. Alternatively, the difference between the actual world in
which Alice rests her hand and the possible world in which she raises it might be attributed
to a modification of the state of the world.3 Indeed, Vihvelin (2013, pp. 164–165) allows
this possibility in her unfolding of Lewis’s first bullet point as the following disjunction:
world and free will in humans is so feeble that even if we grant that the original fwt is non-circular (in
that it proves such indeterminism, as claimed by Conway & Kochen), its implications for free will are at
best speculative.
2Van Inwagen (2008) states that Lewis’s paper is ‘the finest essay that has ever been written in defense
of compatibilism—possibly the finest essay that has ever been written about any aspect of the free will
problem’. For a recent introductory survey of the field see Beebee (2013). Versions of compatibilism vastly
different from Lewis’s have recently been proposed by Berofsky (2012) and Ismael (2016).
3In the philosophical literature this is called backtracking, cf. e.g. Lewis (1979) and Kapitan (2002).
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1. Slightly Different Past: If I had raised my hand, the past would still have been
exactly the same until shortly before the time of my decision.
2. Slightly Different Laws: If I had raised my hand, the laws would have been ever
so slightly different in a way that permitted a divergence from the lawful course of
actual history shortly before the time of my decision.
Lewis (1981) himself rejects the first possibility, referring to his (1979) for an explanation:
‘the way the future is depends counterfactually on the way the present is (. . . )
[much as] the present depends counterfactually on the past (. . . ) [but] not
so in reverse (. . . ) we ordinarily assume that facts about earlier times are
counterfactually independent of the supposition and so may freely be used as
auxiliary premises.’ (Lewis, 1979, pp. 455–456).
Lewis (1979) proposes the hypothesis of Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence, sug-
gesting that ‘the mysterious asymmetry between open future and fixed past is nothing
else than the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence’ (p. 462). If this hypothesis is true,
it would add a “philosophical” direction of time to the “physical” ones that have been
proposed since the time of Boltzmann (Price, 1996; Zeh, 2007; Callender, 2011). From
the point of view of determinism as commonly understood in physics (Earman, 2007),
however, the laws of nature are time-symmetric.4 In view of this, unlike Lewis himself I
am open to the second way in which Alice could (counterfactually) have raised here hand,
namely through an instant (counterfactual) modification of the state of the world, as in
Bennett (1984). This option has been further explicated by Vihvelin (2013, p. 165) as:
1. Same Laws: If I had raised my hand, the laws would still have been the same.
2. Completely Different Past: If I had raised my hand, past history would have
been different all the way back to the Big Bang.
Here I would prefer to write Different Past, since even though in this scenario the state
indeed (by determinism) would have been different all the way back to the Big Bang, the
entire trajectory of the world may or may not be close to the actual one, in some suitable
metric. In this scenario, the two cases Lewis distinguishes take the following form:
• I am able to do something such that, if I did it, the state of the actual world at some
earlier time would have been different.
• I am able to change the state of the actual world at some earlier time.
The latter remains impossible (like breaking a law), whereas it is the former that gives
rise to free will.5 Had he preferred this second scenario, Lewis (1981) would have been
entitled Are we free to change the states? instead of Are we free to break the laws?
Thus there are two different ways in which possible world w (in which Alice lifts her
hand) could differ from the actual world (in which her hand is at rest): either there is some
minor modification in the law governing the time-evolution of the universe (typically given
by a small modification of the Hamiltonian local to Alice), or, with fixed time-evolution,
there is a minor modification of the state of the world (again typically local to Alice at
least at the time she thinks about what to do with her hand). Both would be acceptable
to modern physics and of course, a mixture of these possibilities might be considered, too.
4At least in so far as they apply to everyday situations relevant to the free will debate, hence excepting
some eccentric corners of elementary particle physics involving CP -violation, accessible only in accelerators.
5As noted by Vihvelin (2013, §6.2), this still suffices to undermine the Consequence Argument.
6
3 Compatibilist free will revisited
Either way, as a considerable literature suggests (e.g., Fischer, 1994; Beebee, 2003; Oakley,
2006; Graham, 2008; Pendergraft, 2011; Berofsy, 2012; Dorr, 2016; Ismael, 2016), the
tension between determinism and freedom remains worrying. To relax it, I present a
simple mathematical framework that captures the spirit of compatibilist free will a` la
Lewis, including the idea of agency (which is an important aspect of free will). Here
the intuition is that free will involves a separation between the agent, Alice, (who is to
exercise it) and the rest of the world, under whose influence she acts: think of Alice as
a deterministic chess computer, and of the rest of the world as her opponent. Her moves
are determined by those of her opponent as well as by her own deliberations; the idea
of free will then firstly means that different programs would play differently against the
same opponent, and secondly—in the spirit of Lewis—that Alice has the ability to play
differently from the way she actually does. Through this separation, I attempt to make
the notion of other worlds close to the actual one precise (in a way that differs from Lewis).
I admit that what follows is a rather simple-minded idealization of any notion of
(compatibilist) free will relevant to human behaviour in general (not to speak of moral
issues related to free will), but I do believe that it is an appropriate approach to Alice’s
(alleged) free will in choosing the settings of her experiment (see also the Conclusion).
Let X be the state space of the world, and let
I : X → XI ; (3.1)
O : X → XO, (3.2)
be variables that describe the agent and the rest of the world, respectively; here XI is some
set of “inner states” of the agent, whereas XO consists of “outer states” of the world.
6 Let
XA be some set whose elements denote possible actions a of the agent, and let
A : X → XA (3.3)
be the function that describes which action
a = A(x) ∈ XA (3.4)
the agent takes if the world is in state x. I assume that
A = A(O, I), (3.5)
in the sense that each action a = A(o, i) is a response to both the outer state
o = O(x) (3.6)
of the rest of the universe (perhaps restricted to some relevant part) and the inner state
i = I(x) (3.7)
of the agent. More precisely, there exists some function
Aˆ : XO ×XI → XA, (3.8)
6A special case one may have in mind here is X = XI ×XO, where I and O are projections onto the
first and the second factor, respectively. However, in general XI and XO need not exhaust X.
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such that for each x ∈ X one has
A(x) = Aˆ(O(x), I(x)). (3.9)
Determinism of Alice’s behaviour, briefly called Determinism in what follows,
is expressed by the above framework, combined with the usual assumption of (Laplacian)
determinism,7 stating that there is a dynamical law ϕ : X×R→ X, satisfying ϕ(x, 0) = x
and ϕ(ϕ(x, s), t) = ϕ(x, s + t). Thus Alice’s behaviour a at time t is determined by the
state x0 of the world at any time t0 in the past (or future) through (3.9) with
x = ϕ(x0, t− t0). (3.10)
Freedom is our second fundamental assumption underpinning compatibilist free will.
It states that O and I are independent (or that o and i are free variables), in the sense
that for each (o, i) ∈ XO × XI there is x ∈ X for which (3.6) and (3.7) hold, i.e., the
following function is surjective:
O × I : X → XO ×XI
x 7→ (O(x), I(x)). (3.11)
Rephrasing our earlier analysis in this elementary mathematical language, Lewis wants
to make sense of the idea that although (according to determinism) Alice’s action a =
Aˆ(o, i) at some fixed time t is determined by the state x of the world at that time through
(3.9) and hence through (3.10) it was determined also by any earlier state x0 of the world
at time t0,
8 nonetheless, Alice was able to act otherwise at time t, e.g. she was able to do
a′ = Aˆ(o′, i′), (3.12)
but did not do so, because doing a′ would illegally have modified the state x.
Alice’s ability to do a′ means that there exists a state x′ of the world close to x in that
o′ = O(x′) = O(x) = o, (3.13)
making the outer environment in which Alice acts the same as in the actual world, but
i′ = I(x′) 6= I(x) = i, (3.14)
where i′ should be similar to i in some appropriate sense, such that (3.12) holds.
The point, then, is that according to our Freedom assumption, there indeed is such a
state x′, for any given i′ and (o, i). Thus the freedom the agent has is precisely what I have
formalized as Freedom: even given the state o of the external influences on her behaviour
(and possibly even the state of the rest of the world), there is a different admissible state x′
of the world such that, had this state been actual, the agent would have done a′ (although
she in fact did a). Since the actual world at time t resides in state x, the state x′ (at
the same time) pertains to a possible world w different from the actual. The difference
between the two scenarios discussed in the previous section just lies in the story of how w
was led to state x′: either the law ϕ (Lewis) or the state (Bennett) was modified ever so
slightly prior to time t.
7Compare with a typical philosopher’s definition, e.g.: ‘determinism is the thesis that for every instant
of time t, there is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at that instant, and if P and Q are
any proposition that express the state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of P together
with the laws of nature entails Q’ (Vihvelin, 2013, p. 3). Thus P and Q correspond to our states x at
different times, and ‘the laws of nature’ are combined into our function ϕ. What I have added to this in
my definition is that the state x not only determines future (and past) states, but also controls what is
going on, such as Alice’s actions, namely through functions like A. Without these, states mean little.
8This is the whole point of the so-called Consequence Argument Lewis challenges.
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4 The Free Will Theorem revisited
In this section I argue that in the context of the Free Will Theorem, the freedom of choosing
settings for experiments which Conway and Kochen attribute to physicists is precisely of
the above compatibilist nature. The theorem then establishes a contradiction between the
physics assumptions and the compatibilist free will assumption, so that (accepting just a
small but fundamental corner of modern physics), the latter must fall.
The setting of the Free Will Theorem of Conway & Kochen (2009) was introduced by
epr (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, 1935) and further studied by Bell (1964) and others.
In current jargon two physicists, called Alice and Bob, are far apart whilst performing
simultaneous experiments on some correlated two-particle state (their measurements need
to be spacelike separated). In the situation considered by epr each particle had a spatial
degree of freedom and hence required an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space for its descrip-
tion, but the thrust of the argument comes out more clearly if each particle merely has
an internal degree of freedom (and is “frozen” otherwise). Bell (1964) considered a pair
of spin- 1
2
particles, each of which has Hilbert space C2, but because of its reliance on
the Kochen–Specker Theorem (which fails for C2) the Free Will Theorem requires one
dimension more, i.e., H = C3, seen as the state space of a massive spin-1 particle.9
For my purposes, all we need to know is that the experiment has settings (a, b) “freely
chosen” by Alice and Bob, respectively,10 and outcomes in the form of triples λ, since in
fact Alice and Bob each perform three simultaneous measurements.11 Defining
Λ = {(0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)}. (4.15)
quantum mechanics prescribes that each outcome λ of such a triple measurement must lie
in Λ (so that, in particular, each single measurement of the three performed by both Alice
and Bob must have outcome 0 or 1). Furthermore, on a specific choice of the correlated
two-particle state, namely
ψ0 = (~e1 ⊗ ~e1 + ~e2 ⊗ ~e2 + ~e3 ⊗ ~e3)/
√
3, (4.16)
where (~e1, ~e2, ~e3) is the standard basis of C3, quantum mechanics predicts perfect correla-
tion of measurement outcomes in case that the settings of Alice and Bob agree.12
The Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen (2009) states that three assumptions
called spin, twin, and min, which I will recall below, imply that the response of a spin-one
particle to the kind of experiment described below ‘is not a function of properties of that
part of the universe that is earlier than this response (. . . ).’ This formulation contains an
implicit assumption of determinism, whose precise nature only becomes clear from their
proof, and which is akin to our formulation below, except for the crucial difference that
the function they allude to only acts on the particle variables and not on the settings of
the experiment, of which Conway and Kochen just say that the experimenters can ‘freely
choose’ them. As explained in §1, I (and others) consider this unsatisfactory.
I therefore first state a revised set of assumptions.
9The price of this extra dimension is that the experiment whose outcome provides the empirical input
for the Free Will Theorem has not actually been performed, except at a single wing (Huang et al, 2003).
However, the predictions of quantum mechanics are uncontroversial and will serve as input instead.
10In the context of the fwt the settings are frames, i.e., orthonormal bases of R3 defined up to a sign.
11If a = (~u1, ~u2, ~u3) is the basis chosen by Alice, she measures the three observables (J
2
~u1
, J2~u2 , J
2
~u3
),
where J~u is the angular momentum of the particle along the unit vector ~u. Likewise for Bob.
12Writing b = (~v1, ~v2, ~v3) for Bob’s basis, perfect correlation here means that if ~ui = ~vj , then the
measured value of Alice’s observable J2~ui , which is 0 or 1, always coincides with Bob’s J
2
~vi
.
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• Determinism of measurement outcomes, briefly called Determinism in what
follows, means that there is a state space X with associated functions
A : X → XA, B : X → XB, F : X → Λ, G : X → Λ, Z : X → XZ , (4.17)
where XA = XB is the set of settings available to Alice and Bob and Λ is some set
of possible outcomes, which completely describe the experiment, in the sense that
each state x ∈ X determines both its settings (a = A(x), b = B(x)) and its outcome
(both in Alice’s lab and in Bob’s lab) (λ = F (x), γ = G(x)).
The function Z describes all relevant physical variables except Alice and Bob,13 and
should also be chosen (by the theory in question) in such a way that
F = F (A,B,Z); G = G(A,B,Z). (4.18)
More precisely, there exist certain functions
Fˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → Λ; Gˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → Λ, (4.19)
such that for each x ∈ X one has
F (x) = Fˆ (A(x), B(x), Z(x)); G(x) = Gˆ(A(x), B(x), Z(x)). (4.20)
As in the previous section, these rules should be supplemented with Laplacian de-
terminism in order to deserve the name “Determinism” and have the right interpre-
tation, but the above is what is needed in the proof of the Free Will Theorem.
• Freedom then states that A, B, and Z are independent in that for each (a, b, z) ∈
XA ×XB ×XZ there is an x ∈ X for which A(x) = a, B(x) = b, and Z(x) = z.
• Nature requires that Λ is given by (4.15), and that perfect correlation holds.
• Context locality states that F (A,B,Z) is independent of B and that G(A,B,Z)
is independent of A.14 In other words, sharpening (4.18), we actually have
F = F (A,Z); G = G(B,Z). (4.21)
We then have the following version of the Free Will Theorem (Cator & Landsman, 2014):
Determinism, Freedom, Nature, and Context locality are contradictory.
I refer to the paper just cited for the proof; after some new initial steps, the argument
quickly reduces to the one due to Conway & Kochen (2009), whose assumptions are a
subset of ours: their spin and twin are the first and second half of our Nature axiom,
whilst their min expresses a form of context locality as well as the loose assumption that
Alice and Bob may ‘freely choose’ their settings a and b, respectively. Accordingly, in
terms of our notation, Conway and Kochen only use the parameter space Z, rather than
the full state space X we need in order to consistently axiomatize determinism.15
13The parameter space XZ includes the state of the pair of particles but its precise form is irrelevant.
14The name Context locality, which I learnt from M. Seevinck, distinguishes this condition from various
other notions of locality such as Einstein locality (Haag, 1992), which is satisfied in quantum field theory,
or Bell locality (Bell, 1990), which quantum mechanics violates. There is a probabilistic version of Context
locality, called No signalling (or, for hidden variable theories, Parameter Independence), which holds in
quantum mechanics. Context locality seems the weakest locality condition one may reasonably impose.
15In any case, the essence of the proof lies in the argument that perfect correlation together with context
locality implies non-contextuality.
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5 Conclusion
On my technical (re)formulations of both local miracle compatibilism (cf. §3) and the Free
Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen (in §4), the freedom Alice and Bob enjoy in choosing
their settings is precisely an instance of the kind of free will proposed by Lewis (1981).
More precisely, the mathematical analogy is between:
• The triple (o, i, a) ∈ XO × XI × XA in the philosophical analysis of Alice’s “free”
choice of either resting (a) or raising (a′) her hand—now seen as her choice for either
the actual setting of her experiment or some other—as determined by the outer state
o of the world and her own inner state i. Thus a is her actual setting, predicated on
the state x ∈ X and hence on (o, i) = (O(x), I(x)), which finally yield a = Aˆ(o, i).
• The triple (a, z, λ) ∈ XA × Z × Λ in the experimental setting of the fwt, where a
is the setting of Alice’s wing of the experiment (which from the perspective of the
spin-1 particle plays the role of the outer state of the world), z is the inner state of
the particle, and λ is the outcome of Alice’s measurement.
In the spirit of Conway and Kochen, in the above analogy the Alice of the first bullet point
(whose “free will” they after all believe to be ultimately a consequence of the “free choice”
of elementary particles, cf. §1) plays the role of the spin-1 particles in the second bullet
point. Conversely, the Alice of the second point is like the observable O in the first, which
determines the external situation to which our particle responds (namely the setting a of
the experiment, whose role in the first point is played by the outer state o of the world,
to which Alice responds). Thus the analogy holds both mathematically and conceptually.
Granting this analogy, the Free Will Theorem establishes a contradiction between:
• the physics assumptions, i.e., Nature and Context locality ;
• the compatibilist free will assumption, i.e., Determinism and Freedom.
Accepting the former, the latter must fall. Making this choice, one should realize that the
physics assumptions on the one hand form just a small corner of modern physics (from
which point of view they are weak), but on the other hand have singled out the corner in
which the two fundamental theories of quantum mechanics and special relativity meet and
are brought to a head (from which perspective they are strong). Either way, despite the
lack of explicit experimental backing (which is available for Bell’s Theorem),16 few people
would be willing to reject these physics assumptions (and in any case the exercise is to
determine what modern physics has to say about free will, which presupposes the former).
Finally, although the intention of Conway and Kochen was to support unspecified
versions of libertarian free will through modern physics, our reformulation of their theorem
(which removes the threat of circularity) gives a more subtle picture: the fwt (revisited)
challenges one particular version of compatibilist free will. As such, it only provides indirect
support for libertarian free will, namely by weakening one of its competitors.
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